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JUSTICE

AND JUSTIFICATION
Ch. Perelman*

TWENTY YEARS

ago I published a study on the notion of justice, in which

I tried to delimit the rational aspects of this notion.' I found then that an
act may be qualified as just insofar as it is an application of a rule, in conformity with the rule of justice; 2 and that a rule is just insofar as it is not
arbitrary, i.e., insofar as it can be justified by means of general principles.
Thus, a criminal law will be just if the punishments it prescribes are proportional to the seriousness of the crimes; a regulation fixing the salaries
of public officials will be just if it makes the salaries proportional to rank
and to the services rendered to society. But where are the criteria which
will permit us to evaluate the seriousness of a crime or the utility of a service
rendered? The point I was trying to make in that study was this: that no
matter how hard one might ty to deduce such criteria from rational norms,
in the end one would always come up against a vision of the world based
on nonrational values and aspirations. 3
It seemed to me that the various ideals we might have of a perfect
society were all arbitrary, since they could be founded neither on experience
nor on logic. In effect, neither rigorous deduction nor any induction based
on experience can guarantee the passage from what is objectively given and
true, to the ideal we seek to realize and to the values and rules which that
ideal demands. I therefore concluded that, in our effort to justify rules by
eliminating what is arbitrary in them, we had to stop at unjustified and not
self-evident principles, at positions we ourselves chose, at values which could
be controverted. It seemed hopelessly idealistic to expect all men to agree on
the same ideal of a just society. To different human aspirations, arranged in
different hierarchies, there would correspond different conceptions of the ideal
community. If someone found a rule unjust, because it divided people into
different categories from those he would have chosen - and this because his
personal vision of the world made him judge differently of what was or was not
Translated by SUSAN RUBIN.
De la Justice (1945). English trans. in THE IDEA OF JUSTICE AND THE PBOBLEM OF
ARGUMENT 1-60 (London, Routledge and Kegan Paul; New York, The Humanities Press,
1963).
2 THE RULE OF JUSTICE, in THE IDEA OF JUSTICE 79-87.
s THE IDEA OF JUSTICE 52-63.
*
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important or relevant-then no rational argument seemed to me capable
of convincing him to change his mind. Given the plurality of often incompatible and always arbitrary values, it seemed to me that reason was incapable of reconciling any two antagonists. A rigorous analysis had to limit
itself to pointing out the different values which underlie different social
systems. This is the kind of work done by Enrico di Robilant in his Sui
Principi di Giustizia, where by comparing the Prussian (Landrecht) Code
of 1794 and the present Italian Constitution, he shows convincingly the
different values which inspired them. But was it possible to find objective
criteria which would allow one to demonstrate the undeniable superiority
of one of these value systems over the other? This seemed to me absolutely
impossible. My analysis twenty years ago led to the following skeptical
conclusion:
Let us take the example of a normative system which has the peculiarity
of attaching the highest merit to the stature of individuals. From this
system will flow rules imposing the obligation to treat men in a fashion
more or less proportional to their height. From this system one can try
to eliminate every arbitrary rule, all unequal treatment, all favouritism,
all injustice. From the inside of the system, so long as the fundamental
principle that serves as its basis is not called in question, justice will have
a well-defined meaning - that of avoiding anything arbitrary in the
rules, any irregularity in action.
We are thus led to distinguish three elements in justice- the value
that is its foundation, the rule that sets it out, the act that gives it effect.
Only the two latter elements - the less important, incidentally - can
be subjected to the requirements of reasoning. We can require of the act
that it should be in accordance with the rules, that it should give the
same treatment to persons who belong to the same essential category.
We can require that the rule should be justified, that it should flow logically
from the normative system adopted. As for the value that is the foundation of the normative system, we cannot subject it to any rational criterion:
4
it is utterly arbitrary and logically indeterminate.
I
By QUALIFYING any value which founds a normative system as arbitrary and
logically indeterminate, I was expressing my conviction that such a value
could be neither the result of experience nor the logical consequence of incontestable principles. I continue to believe this today. Yet is this a reason
for drawing the much more general conclusion that all the fundamental
4

Id. at 56.
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values and norms which guide our actions are devoid of rationality? that
they can be neither criticized nor justified? and that all discussion on them
is but the expression of our interests and passions? This conclusion is enough
to reduce a rationalist to despair. Yet it must be adopted by all those who
say that proof must be founded on either logic or experience, since deduction
and induction are the only forms of orderly reasoning. If we adopt this
point of view, we must indeed subscribe to a conclusion that jars ordinary
common sense, namely that all values are equally arbitrary since none can
be demonstrated rationally. Is it really necessary to subscribe to the view
of reason and of reasoning which has been imposed on us by modem logic?
Is it really true that deduction and induction are the only acceptable bases
for proof, and that therefore it is impossible to reason about values?
In 1927 the French logician Edmond Goblot published a book on the
logic of value judgments. In this interesting work Goblot analyzed only
instrumental values, values which constitute either means or obstacles to
desired ends. The ends themselves were treated as given, i.e., founded on intuitions which escaped rational control. Numerous works have also been published over the last thirty years on the logic of norms or deontological logic.
These have been concerned only with general rules of transformation for
propositions containing expressions like "it is obligatory," "it is forbidden,"
"it is necessary," "it is allowed," etc. They have made no attempt to guide
us in the choice of particular rules or values.
Must we then conclude that the determination of noninstrumental values
- as well as that of norms which prescribe our rights and obligations escapes all logic and all rationality? Must we abandon all philosophical use
of practical reason and limit ourselves to the technical use of reason in the
domain of action? Must we use our reason only to adjust our means to
totally irrational ends? Affirmative answers to these questions form the
position of all positivistic philosophers, from Hume to Ayer. Must we then
resign ourselves, and consider the whole classical tradition of Western philosophy as nothing more than the expression of a millenarian dream? Are
the search for a rational foundation for our individual and collective actions,
and the desire to elaborate an ethic, a philosophy of law, and a political
philosophy nourished only on illusion and illogic? 5
It long seemed to me that before accepting the theses of positivism conceming values, someone should make a renewed effort to elaborate a logic
of value judgments based not on the reasoning techniques of modern logic
but rather on a detailed examination of how men actually reason on values.
5 Cf. my L'idial de rationalit

et la rigle de justice, BULLETIN DR LA
1, January 1961.

FRANgrAtsE DR PHILOSOPmIE, 55th year, No.
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I undertook to do this work with the collaboration of Madame L. OlbrechtsTyteca. Ten years after the beginning of our project, we had not found
the logic of value judgments that we were looking for. We did, however,
rediscover a long-neglected logic which had been completely forgotten by
contemporary logicians, although it had been treated at length in the ancient
treatises on rhetoric and in the Topics of Aristotle. This was the study of what
Aristotle called dialectical proofs in contrast to the analytical proofs which
interest modern logicians exclusively. In an extended empirical and analytical
study called Traitd de 1'argumentation6 Mine. Olbrechts-Tyteca and I were
able to put forward this nonformal logic as a theory of argumentation, complementary to the theory of demonstration which is the object of formal logic.
Our research convinced us that there exists no specific logic concerning
values; rather, the same techniques of reasoning which we use to criticize
and to justify opinions, choices, claims, and decisions, are also used when
it comes to criticizing and justifying statements that are usually qualified
as value judgments. That is why the practical use of reason cannot be
understood without first integrating it into a general theory of argumentation.
By forgetting the technique of argumentation indispensable for practical
judgment, and by overlooking discursive means of convincing not founded
on formal logic or experience, modem thinkers were inevitably led to the conclusion that values were logically arbitrary and therefore devoid of rational
justification. In the absence of a theory of argumentation one could not even
know what was specific to the process of justification, much less specify its
relationship to the idea of justice.
The object itself of a justification is very different from the object of a
demonstration. The latter is developed from statements or propositions of
which we can ask whether they are true or false, whereas the former is of
an entirely practical nature: we usually justify an action, a kind of behavior,
a disposition to act, a claim, a choice, a decision. 7 We can speak only indirectly of the justification of a person acting or of a proposition. The
justification of an actor consists in the fact of justifying his conduct, or
sometimes in dissociating him either wholly or in part from an act or a
decision which is imputed to him. But in the latter instance it is more a
question of excusing than of justifying: one simply wants to avoid having
the judgment of an act transferred to the person performing it.
6 TRAITi DE L'ARGUMENTATION (Paris, Presses Universitaires de France, 1958). To be
published in English by the University of California Press.
7 Cf. my Jugements de valeur, justification et argumentation, REvuE INTERNATIONALE
DE PHILosoPHIE, No. 58, 1961. Reprinted in JUSTICE ET RAisON 234-43 (Presses Universitaires de Bruxelles, 1963).
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The justification of a proposition or of a rule, on the other hand, consists in justifying one's adhesion to it or one's statements in favor of it. It is,
then, a justification of behavior. Since we consider it reasonable to adhere
to a true statement, the proof of the truth of a statement will certainly constitute the greatest part of our justification. But no demonstration or verification will allow one to justify his adhesion to an axiom or a norm; it is
precisely here that the particularities of justificatory reasoning come into
play. This kind of reasoning constitutes what Professor Feigl calls vindicatio
actionis, the justification of an action, rather than validatio cognitionis or
proof of the validity of knowledge.8 But even in this last instance we are dealing with the justification of a belief, of a kind of behavior.
For centuries logicians have been able to neglect the problem of the
justification of one's choice of axioms, by considering the latter either as
self-evident or as arbitrary. In the first case, since we must bow to the evidence, we have no choice and therefore no need to justify our acceptance.
In the second case, since all choices are considered equally arbitrary, it is
impossible to justify any one by showing it to be preferable to any other.
When we reject both of these extremes, so reminiscent of realism and nominalism, when we admit that a choice of axioms is possible and that it is
not entirely arbitrary, then the justification of choice ceases being a negligible
problem.
If we transpose the same reasoning to the first principles of philosophy,
which are considered to be neither self-evident nor arbitrary, the very center
of philosophical thinking becomes transferred from the realm of theory to
that of practice; we are heading toward the justification of our philosophical
choices and decisions. But a philosophical justification must not refer to the
interests and passions of a particular group: if it is not presented as being
universally valid, it does not constitute an admissible philosophical justification. A philosophical justification must be rational, or at least reasoned.
To admit the possibility of a rational or reasoned justification is at the
same time to recognize the practical use of reason. It means that we are
no longer limiting reason to a purely theoretical usage (i.e., the discovery
of truth or error), as Hume wished. 9 To reason is not merely to verify and
to demonstrate, but also to deliberate, to criticize, and to justify; to give
reasons for and against; in a word, to argue.

s H.

Feigl, De Principhis non Disputandum, in PHILOSOPHICAL ANALYSIS

Black, New York, 1950).
1 DAvm HUME, A TREATISE ON HUMAN NATURE bk. III, pt. I, sec. 1.

(ed. by M.
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It would never occur to us to want to justify every one of our actions
or beliefs. Methodical doubt as practiced by Descartes is conceivable only
if a self-evident, indubitable intuition allows us to eliminate it. The problem
of justification arises only in the practical realm, when we have to justify
a decision, an action, or a choice which has no incontrovertible evidence to
guarantee its validity. In this perspective, a desire to justify everything appears
completely senseless, for it is unrealizable and would only lead to infinite
regression. The enterprise of justification has meaning only if the acts one
is seeking to justify are open to criticism; that is, if they possess some fault
that makes them inferior to other acts which are uncriticized and which
therefore need no justification.
One often has the impression that justification is not the refutation of
a criticism but rather the statement of positive reasons in favor of a choice
or a decision. These reasons are meant to show that the choice or decision
in question is above criticism, and especially above any criticism one might
advance from possible alternatives. To allow for such various modalities, we
may say that justification consists either in the refutation of specific criticism or
in the indication that a proposition is entirely above criticism, or at least
that it is less open to criticism than other alternatives.
The criticism of a proposed or already enacted measure, decision, or
action is usually directed against its morality, its legality, its regularity (understood in its widest sense), its usefulness, or its opportuneness. In order to
criticize, therefore, one must already have certain values or ends in mind,
in whose name the criticism is advanced. Whenever a form of conduct or
a project conforms indisputably to the accepted norms, or fully realizes
some recognized end, it will thereby escape criticism and thus be in no need
of justification. The same is true of acts which do not have to conform to
any norms and do not claim to pursue any determined end. The conduct
of a God, for example, defined as an absolutely perfect will, is not subordinated to any norm; the same is true of a sovereign power considered to
be legibus solutus, or superior to any law. Justification, therefore, can deal
only with debatable things, and usually only with things that have been
criticized for specific reasons.
An absolute value cannot be criticized, and it needs no justification: it
is enough merely to show that by criticizing and justifying an absolute, one
would transform it into a relative and subordinate value. But what is true
of absolutes is also true of autonomous entities. Just as a sovereign power
refuses to bend to laws imposed on it from the outside, so any discipline which
claims to be autonomous, especially if its autonomy is claimed with regard
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to philosophy, refuses to submit its theses and presuppositions to philosophical
criticism. Specialists in mathematics, history, or law would be stepping outside their disciplines if they had to concern themselves with philosophical
principles and argue over such matters as the existence of mathematical
entities, the reality of the past, or the necessity of punishment. Their interest
lies in modalities: how to construct mathematical entities, how to know the
past, how to elaborate a penal code.
This conception of philosophical problems as having nothing to do with
a specific discipline-a conception well-nigh taken for granted in scientific
and technological circles-seems incomprehensible to anyone adopting the
traditionally accepted point of view of Western philosophy. According to
this point of view, whatever is not certain must be questioned; but since
certainty is the same for all reasonable beings, everyone should arrive at the
same certainties, that is to say, at the same principles. It would be inadmissible for science and philosophy to start from different starting points; they
should both accept the same criteria and the same norms of criticism and
of justification. This consequence is a necessary one if all human beings
endowed with reason are interchangeable, and if facts and verities announce
themselves to all attentive listeners. It matters little what qualifications or
special capacities a critic possesses if his objections are admitted by everyone,
if the criteria and norms of their validity are universally admitted. But if
the criteria and norms in whose name a criticism is made are not unanimously
accepted and if their interpretation as well as their application to specific cases
can give rise to divergent opinions, then the qualifications and the specialized
capacities of the commentators become an essential element, and sometimes even a prerequisite for debate.
It is true that the search for universally valid principles which would
provide a common context for all criticisms and all justifications has been a
millennial aspiration of all philosophy, and especially of all rationalist philosophy. But, in fact, criticism and justification are always found in a historically determined context. For all societies and for all intellects, there
exist certain acts, certain persons acting, certain values and beliefs which
at a given moment are approved without reservations and accepted without
argument; hence, there is no need to justify them. These acts, these persons,
these values, and these beliefs furnish precedents, models, convictions, and
norms which in turn permit the elaboration of criteria by which to criticize
and to justify prevailing attitudes, dispositions, and propositions. But one
need not adopt an absolutist point of view in order to recognize this fact.
Absolutism consists in the assertion that these acts, agents, convictions, and
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values will serve eternally and universally as models. The classical idea of
justification is based on an absolutist vision, since it looks for an absolute,
irrefutable, and universally valid foundation.
If we reject the absolutist point of view, we may admit that the precedents
and models, the convictions and values which give rise to criticism and to
justification are relative to a specific discipline and a specific environment,
and that they can vary in time and in space. Criticism and justification need
no longer appear nontemporal or universally valid. The problem of knowing
who is qualified or competent to criticize and to judge, and the problem
of determining the modalities of criticism and of justification, then become
the essential problems. In this perspective, the juridical model takes on its
full importance. 10
The jurists whose role it is to maintain and to regulate a stable social
order by reducing the number of conflicts and by searching for peaceful
means of settling them, have devised a number of institutions and rules of
procedure; according to these, certain people have the power to legislate,
others the power to govern, and still others the competence to judge and to
elucidate the law. As H. L. A. Hart has convincingly shown, it is the existence of such rules that allows us to distinguish law from ethics." Similarly,
it is the presuppositions and the recogniked methods of each discipline which
allow us to distinguish it from philosophy.
Who has the authority to legislate? Who has the competence to judge?
If we admit that every man is the reflection of a divine reason and that the
same standards of good and evil are inscribed in the heart and conscience
of all men, then the rules granting authority and competence turn out to
be of no importance, for everyone will apply the same rules in the same way.
This is the kind of optimism that justifies the anarchist doctrines advocating
a society without government, legislators, or judges. Those, on the other
hand, who insist that only an elite or even only a single individual can know
the right rules and the art of applying them, will grant authority and competence in legislation and judgment only to an assembly of sages or priests,
or else to a philosopher-king. But those who believe that anarchy leads to
disorder, and that the utopia of a philosopher-king or of a government of
wise men, priests, mandarins, or technocrats leads to the despotism of one
man or of a supposedly enlightened clique, will have to look elsewhere for
the foundation of the authority of legislators and the competence of judges.

10 Cf. my Ce qu'une riflexion sur le droit peut apporter au philosophe, in
RAISON.

II H. L. A.

HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW

ch. V (1961).
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When objective and universally admitted criteria are missing, we must
fall back on personal criteria and grant to some people the authority to legislate and govern, and the competence to judge. These powers, whether they
be possessed or conferred, must in turn be justified by the confidence those
who exercise the powers inspire and by the authority which is, in fact, recognized in them. This confidence manifests itself in various ways. It may
become explicit at election time, when the people not only choose their
representatives but also have a chance to control the manner in which they
fulfill their duties. It may be implicit and taken for granted, as long as the
people do not revolt against their rulers. Whenever it seems preferable to
make certain posts permanent and certain judges irremovable, it is also
necessary to allow for mechanisms of control and procedures for appeal.
The legislators, executives, and judges who are elected or appointed by
those who possess the confidence of the people must exercise their mandates
in conformity with the aspirations of the community which they represent.
The role of the legislator and of the judge- insofar as the latter does not
merely apply the law mechanically, but rather interprets and supplements
it-does not consist in personal decisions as to what is just without taking
into account the aspirations of the public which is the source of their power.
These aspirations may be varied and often contradictory, ill-expressed, or
even incoherent. That is precisely why the role of the legislator is a creative
one.' 2 Even while taking into account the wishes of the public, the legislator
must try to formulate rules and specify criteria which will synthesize those
wishes. He will thus have to elaborate a juridical order that will be spontaneously accepted as just by the body of the people. Carl Friedrich rightly
insists on this: "The most just act is the one which is compatible with the
greatest number-and the greatest intensity-of values and beliefs."' 3
It goes without saying that the values and beliefs in question are those of
the community in whose name political power is being exercised.
The laws, customs, and regulations of a community are assumed to be
just by the mere fact of their existence, and there will be no need to justify
them so long as no criticisms arise concerning them. If criticism does arise,
the critics will have to show that a given law is unjust, either because it is
ineffective, or because it does not provide a good means for realizing its
purported end, or again because it is incompatible with one of the accepted
12 Cf. Clarence Morris, Law, Justice and the Public's Aspirations, in NoMos VI 170-190
(1963).
18 C. J. Friedrich, Justice: the Political Act, in NoMos VI 31ff; also, Ch. 17 ("Political
Representation and Responsibility") in FaIDRIcH, MAN AND His GOVERNMENT (New
York, 1963).
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values of the community. Any criticism intended to reform a law must be
submitted to the evaluation of the legitimate holders of legislative power, to
those who possess the authority to vote and to modify the laws. In most cases
their legitimacy is a result of legality, power having been conferred on them
in accordance with prevailing legal procedures. It is in their role as the holders
of legitimate power that they have the authority to settle controversial problems. But in the long run the prestige of authority can be maintained only
if it is exercised in such a way as not to deviate too much from what the
people expect. If the authorities ignore too blatantly the aspirations of the
people, they run the risk of increasing opposition which will finally cause
the overthrow of the government by elections, coup d'6tat, or revolution.
This analysis leads to the relativization of the notion of political justice.
Politically just laws and regulations are those which are not arbitrary, because they correspond to the beliefs and the aspirations and the values of
the political community. If the restraints imposed by a legitimate power
are in accordance with the wishes of the community, the decisions of that
power are politically just, because it is the community's convictions and
aspirations which furnish the criteria of political action. But if this reasoning
is satisfactory from the point of view of democratic ideology, is it equally
satisfactory from the philosophic point oi view?
If we had to equate what is politically just with what is philosophically
just, we would join Rousseau in a deification of the general will and of the
absolutism which results from it. The adoption of the slogan vox populi vox
Dei transforms the general will into an absolute norm which no criticism
may oppose. At the same time, by bending to the beliefs, aspirations, and
values of the political community we abandon our search for a rational
criterion of criticism for those beliefs, aspirations, and values. Such a renunciation would have serious consequences. It would mean not only that
we considered some obviously imperfect and variable human decisions as
perfect and infallible, but also that we allowed force and force alone to settle
conflicts between political communities whose aspirations and values turned
out to be incompatible. By giving up the search for criteria and norms which
transcend those of politically organized communities, we would give up the
traditional role of ethics, jurisprudence, and political philosophy. Incapable
of fortifying justice, the practical philosopher would by his skepticism limit
himself to justifying force. Force would become the criterion and ultimate
judge of values and of norms.
Our analysis leaves us floundering between Scylla and Charybdis. Wishing to avoid the use of force in imposing values claimed as absolutes, we see
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that only force seems capable of settling conflicts between relative values.
Our philosophical attempt to substitute reason for violence in practical affairs
seems to lead inevitably to failure.
But must we be cornered between these two equally disastrous solutions?
If we reject an absolutism which claims to be founded on self-evident intuitions, and reject also the anarchic disorder and despotic violence which result
from such claims, must we then cynically admit the arbitrariness of all values
and all norms? Must we inevitably admit that might is right, and that force
is the ultimate foundation of all systems of justice?
History has repeatedly taught us that it is dangerous to try to impose on
others by means of violence and inquisition the convictions and values
cherished by a philosopher or a prophet as absolutely true and just. Only
a step separates the philosopher-king and the armed prophet from the tyrant,
and a clear conscience makes a tyrant only more tyrannical. But if the
philosopher must renounce the use of force in imposing his ideas, is it not
his duty to convince people, and show them that by becoming more reasonable they will become more just?
But in what sense can we affirm the reasonableness of values, criteria,
and norms? Is it possible in the practical realm to transcend the aspirations
of a political community? Do we possess philosophical criteria which will
allow us to criticize and justify them?
II
The legislators and judges who employ sanctions and constraints to
assure respect for law and the execution of sentences, owe it to themselves
to exercise their functions in the spirit in which those functions have been
conferred on them. The legislators must elaborate laws which will be just
because in harmony with the aspirations of the community they represent;
the judges must apply the laws in a spirit of equity, in accordance with the
traditions of the community whose judges they are. But the philosopher's
role, unlike the judge's, does not consist in cultivating respect for the established order; nor does the philosopher, like the politician, have to conform
to the wishes of an electorate in order to win votes. If such a thing as a
philosopher's mission exists, it is that he be the advocate of reason and the
defender of universal values valid for all men. In the words of Husserl,
"We philosophers are the administrators of humanity. '"14
14

LEs

E. Husserl, La crise des sciences europlennes et la ph-nominologie transcendantale,
142 (Paris, 1949).
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In an absolutist perspective, be it that of a realist, an idealist, or a voluntarist, the notions of reason and of universal value present no difficulty. If
there exists an absolute reality, an absolute mind or an absolute will which
enlightens our reason and commands our heart and conscience with a necessity and certainty which excludes both doubt and ambiguity, then the philosopher will have but to incorporate the inventory of these truths which impose
themselves on all into a treatise of natural or rational law which no normal
human being would think of contesting.
But, in reality, things are not so simple. True, we can all invoke certain
universal values like truth, justice, and beauty; we all agree that they exist,
and none of us would think of rejecting them. But our agreement lasts only
as long as we remain on the level of generalizations. As soon as we try to
pass from this agreement in abstracto to some concrete applications, controversy begins. The fact that all admire and respect truth, justice, and beauty
does not mean that all agree on what is true, just, and beautiful.
Similarly, agreement might be reached on a number of general norms
presented as universally valid absolutes, such as "One should do good and
avoid evil," "No one should be made to suffer unnecessarily," "We should
always aim for the greatest good of the greatest number," and "The principle
of our conduct must always be valid as . rule of universal legislation." Each
one of these norms expresses, in its own way, a universally valid norm. But
is it not obvious that innumerable and ever-renewable discussions will arise
each time we try to apply these rules to concrete situations? Does everyone
always agree on what is good and what is evil, on the necessities which
justify suffering, on what constitutes the greatest good of the greatest number,
or on the valid rules of universal legislation? Practical reason, which is supposed to guide us in our actions, unfortunately does not lead all its spokesmen
to the same decisions. Must we, then, in confronting these facts, draw the
disenchanted conclusion that a general accord on so-called universal values
and norms is an illusion, and that we are dealing with vacant forms, rules
which no one rejects because everyone is free to interpret them in his own
fashion?
Lawmaking does not seem to seek universal norms. Yet to the extent
that legal activity pretends to a certain rationality, it might be useful to
examine the role of judges in applying the law, and that of legislators in
formulating it. Such an examination might enlighten us concerning the role
of reason in action.
How should one conceive the ideal of a just judge? What is his role in
the administration of justice? A just judge is not an objective and disinterested
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spectator whose judgments are just because in describing faithfully what he
sees they conform to some exterior reality. The judge cannot stop at letting
the facts speak for themselves: he must take a position with respect to them.
The just judge is impartial; having no tie with any of the litigants before
him, he applies to all of them the juridical rules prescribed by the legal system.
Yet the judge is not a simple spectator, for he has a mission, which is to
state the law. Through his decisions he must make the norms of the community respected.
The judge's mission may be clarified by considering the task of the arbiter.
When the litigants are not before a judge but before an arbiter freely chosen
by them, they wish to be judged not according to norms imposed by law
but according to norms shared by them and the arbiter. Who the arbiter
will be is an essential consideration when litigants agree to submit to arbitration. It is not enough that the arbiter be impartial with regard to two parties
unknown to him - if that were the case, any stranger could do the job. His
decision must not be arbitrary, as if he were merely tossing a coin. The ideal
arbiter will be he whose sense of equity is guided by the same values, the
same principles, and the same procedures as the litigants before him. If
that is the case, then theWe.desired impartiality is not just an absence of prejudice; it is an active commitment to common norms and values. Consequently,
every time that the values, principles, and procedures of the litigants are
different, they will have to have recourse to different arbiters.
To settle a conflict between management and labor, for example, someone will be called in who, while favoring neither of the parties, is nevertheless familiar with the principles according to which they wish him to act.
Furthermore, he will have to aim also at contributing to the realization of
an end which is common to both parties, such as the prosperity of the economy. If two people in the same branch of industry are in litigation, they will
choose as their arbiter a respected member of their profession. The latter
will have the confidence of both parties because he is familiar with the usages
and customs of the profession and has regard for the honor of all its members.
An arbiter chosen for a labor or commercial dispute would not necessarily
be qualified to arbitrate a conflict between the United States and Cuba. In
this instance a neutral would have to be found who, familiar with the principles of international law and devoted to the cause of peace and the maintenance of international order, would be guided by those ends in working out a
just solution. In the same fashion, a just legislator looks for rules which, not
favoring a particular side, seek to realize the values and the ends corresponding to the aspirations of the whole community.
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Taking the judge, arbiter, and legislator as models, how should we define
the role of the philosopher, who has to formulate just laws and judge in
an impartial fashion, not for a given society or a limited social or professional
group, but for the whole of humanity? What distinguishes him as such is
that he must look for criteria and principles and formulate values and norms
capable of winning the adherence of all reasonable men.
If the philosopher succeeds in finding certain criteria and principles,
certain values and norms which to his knowledge are not rejected by any
reasonable being, he will gladly make these the basis for a universal law.
Such principles and values possess the advantage of not having to be justified
-not
because they are self-evident, but simply because they are not contested. Privileged principles of this sort will be most often ambiguous or
equivocal and hence liable to different interpretations. Then the philosopher's
role will be to clarify and specify them, by discarding those formulations and
interpretations which in his view could not be defended before a universal
audience. He will act according to the same considerations in working out
the techniques of proof and interpretation which are indispensable for the
establishment of facts and the application of laws. In his effort to formulate
just rules, he will seek, like the common law judge, precedents to guide his
judgment, while accepting only those motivating principles of decision
(rationes decidendi) which are capable of becoming the laws of a universal
legislation.
The conclusion recalls Kant's categorical imperative. Let us examine
Kant's ideas more closely. This will give a more exact idea of how my theses
are similar to his, and how they differ from them.
At the beginning of the first book of the Critique of Practical Reason,
Kant states the following definitions:
Practical principles are propositions which contain a general determination of the will, having under it several practical rules. They are
subjective, or maxims, when the condition is regarded by the subject as
valid only for his own will, but are objective, or practical laws, when
the condition is recognized as objective, that is valid, for the will of every
rational being. 1 5
The categorical imperative, which is the fundamental law of pure
practical reason, is formulated as follows: "Act so that the maxim of
your will can always at the same time hold good as a principle of uni' 16
versal legislation.'
15 IMMANUEL KANT, CRITIQUE OF PRACTICAL REASON 105 (6th ed., tr. by Thomas K.

Abbott, 1909).
10 Id. at 119.
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We may translate Kant's categorical imperative into judicial language
as follows: "You must conduct yourself as if you were a judge whose ratio
decidendi had to furnish a principle valid for all men." Apart from my
emphasis on precedents, to which the ratio decidendi must be related, my
formulation seems at first glance to differ very little from Kant's categorical
imperative. Yet its actual meaning is different because of the clear distinction which Kant establishes between the subjective and the objective.
In opposing maxims to laws, Kant tells us that the maxim is subjective
because the subject considers the condition which determines his will to be
valid only for his will. The law, in contrast, is objective if the condition is
recognized to be valid for the will of all reasonable men. This dichotomy,
with its opposition between the individual and the universal, seems to me
to be contradictory to the facts and chimerical. As soon as we formulate
principles of action, whatever they may be, we eliminate something of the
arbitrary from our conduct. Our behavior, being ruled, is no longer entirely
dependent on our subjective whims; our rule might even become the principle of action of a community, if its members were inclined to accept it.
On the other hand, none of us is the judge in the last instance of principles
considered to be objectively valid; that is, valid for the will of any reasonable
man. No one of us can declare, a priori, as a result of his own conviction,
that any man who does not consider such principles to be objectively valid
is not a reasonable man.
Experience of the relations between rules and the will shows us that there
rarely is a purely subjective'rule and that we can never be sure of dealing
with an objective and universally valid rule. What we actually do find is
a progressive universalization of our moral principles, which allows us gradually to elaborate reasonable principles of action for all mankind. The
essential function of the philosopher is, perhaps, to formulate such practical
principles, while the scholar exercises a similar function in the realms of
science or theoretical reason. The specific role of philosophy is, in effect,
to propose to humanity objective principles of action which will be valid
for the will of all reasonable men. This objectivity will not consist either in
conformity to some exterior object or in submission to the commands of any
particular authority. It envisages an ideal of universality and constitutes an
attempt to formulate norms and values which could be proposed to every
reasonable being. But to propose does not mean to impose. This distinction
must be maintained at all cost. Otherwise we run the risk of a philosopherking who would use the political authority and power of the State to insure
the supremacy of his convictions, his values, and his norms.
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For Kant, a pure practical law, established a priori, can only be formal
-that is, its form alone makes it appropriate for universal legislation. My
views go beyond that, for I do not believe that a philosopher should limit
himself to the formulation of a purely formal law comparable to the rule of
justice. It goes without saying, however, that the propositions the philosopher
might present to all men cannot prevail with a necessity and an evidence
which would put them beyond the test of any challenge.
We know that philosophers who invoke universal values like truth, goodness, justice, and reality as opposed to appearance are rarely in agreement
as to the criteria and the content of those values. Does this mean that their
efforts, and the conceptual constructs which result from them, are nothing
but illusions, or that individual myths have merely replaced traditional and
collective ones? This is what we would have to say about metaphysical assertions, if we had to assimilate them to empirically verifiable scientific theories.
But assertions which represent the systematic formulation of an ideal cannot
be judged the way we judge factual judgments. Their role is not to conform
to experience, but to furnish criteria for evaluating and judging experience
and, if necessary, for disqualifying certain aspects of it. This is exactly what
a philosopher does who opposes reality to appearance through the establishment of a hierarchy of values among th, diverse manifestations of reality.
Philosophers who refuse to recognize this primacy of practical reason
have often exposed themselves to the criticism of the positivist by presenting
ontologies and theories of being as if they were on the same level as scientific theories of reality. But reality as conceived by philosophers is always
normative, for it aims at the devaluation of those manifestations of reality
which are qualified as appearance or illusion. This is true even of the positivists, for their conception of reality validates that of the natural sciences
and dismisses all other approaches to reality as mythical or illusory. The
same normative approach can be seen in the philosophical use of the notion
of "nature," whether it is a question of following nature or of opposing it.
The term "natural" will be applied to certain characteristics, and it will
vary with those who use it. Nature for the Stoics coincides with reason, but
for the romantics it coincides with passion and opposes social conventions
which are considered to be artificial.
The activity of the philosopher, master of wisdom and guide for actions,
consists in taking a stand correlative to his vision of the world; it is based
on selection, on choice. The danger of choice is partiality, a neglect of
opposing points of view and a closing of the mind to the ideas of others.
The difficulty of the philosopher's task is that, like a just judge, he must

CH. PERELMAN

arrive at decisions while remaining impartial. That is why the philosopher's
rationality will be founded on a rule common to all tribunals worthy of that
name: audiatur et altera pars. In philosophy, opposing points of view must
be heard, whatever their nature or their source. This is a fundamental principle for all philosophers who do not pretend to found their conceptions on
necessity and self-evidence; for it is only by this principle that they can justify
their claim to universality.
Just as a judge, after he has heard the parties, must choose between them,
so a philosopher cannot grant the same validity to all opinions. Many of
the theses and values submitted to his scrutiny represent interests and aspirations of limited scope and conflict with views of universal scope. In the
measure that the philosopher bases his decisions on rules which must be valid
for all mankind, he cannot subscribe to principles and values which cannot
be universalized, and which could therefore not be accepted by the universal
audience to which he addresses himself.
.In questions of justification and of argumentation generally, where one
is dealing with reasons for or against a given thesis, both the critics and the
defenders of the thesis assume the existence of criteria, values, and norms
recognized in advance by those who will have to judge the pertinence of the
criticism or the soundness of the defense. A speaker who is trying to convince his audience, that is, the totality of those he is addressing, must, even at
the risk of petitio principii, base his argumentation only on principles that
his audience admits at the start.
The notions of discourse, speaker, and audience are technical notions found
in classical rhetoric. If we want to give them philosophical significance, we
must generalize them. By discourse we mean any form of argumentation
designed to win the support of others, regardless of length or manner of
presentation. A speaker is the one who presents this argumentation. An
audience is the totality of those whose adherence he wants to win. It is important to note that a speaker must adapt his discourse to his audience, whatever that audience may be- a crowd gathered in a marketplace, a learned
society, a judge hearing a case, an individual deliberating, or finally the universal audience that incarnates what we traditionally call reason.
The appeal to reason has always been characteristic of philosophical
discourse. Ever since Plato and Aristotle, but especially since Descartes,
reason in philosophy has been defined as that faculty in every normal human
being, whether or not it is a reflection of divine reason, which allows him
to apprehend evidence or that which imposing itself on the reason of a
single person, by that very fact imposes itself on all beings endowed with
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reason. This faculty, characteristic of every man and common to all men,
was supposed to grasp universally valid truths by means of intuition and
is therefore supposed to be the same in every man, independently of personality and environment, education and past history. Against this supraindividual and antihistorical conception of reason the romantics and existentialists rebelled.
Admitting the valid aspects of their criticism, I maintain nonetheless
that all philosophy is an appeal to reason. But my conception of reason
differs from the classical conception. I do not see it as a faculty in contrast
to other faculties in man. I conceive of it as a privileged audience, the universal audience. The appeal to reason is but an attempt to convince the members of this audience-whom common sense would define as well-informed
and reasonable men- by addressing them. It is to these men, or at least
to the universal audience as he imagines it, that the philosopher speaks. It is
this audience, with its convictions and its aspirations, that the philosopher
wants to convince, starting from postulates and using arguments which he
thinks will be acceptable to every one of its members. To achieve his end,
the philosopher must use a rational argumentation conforming to Kant's
categorical imperative: his postulates and his reasoning must be valid for
17
the whole of the human community.
In elaborating his argumentation, the philosopher is perforce obliged
to imagine the audience he wants to convince - with the consequent danger
that his imagination will not coincide with reality. That is why his theses
must be tested by submitting them to the actual approval of the members
of that audience. They may challenge the convictions and aspirations which
the philosopher attributes to them, or resist the manner in which he selects,
formulates, and specifies those convictions to fit the needs of his discourse,
or object to the argumentation on which he bases his conclusions. Without
this possibility of being always open to dialogue, without a readiness to
listen to criticism and to take account of it if he cannot refute it, the philosopher cannot claim to transcend the beliefs, interests, and aspirations of the
particular groups which make up the audiences addressed, for example, by
theologians or politicians.
The characteristic of rational argumentation is the aim for universality
-an
aim whose realization is never assured. It is useless to try to define
rational argumentation the way we define a demonstrative technique, i.e.,
by its conformity to certain prescribed rules. Unlike demonstrative reasoning, arguments are never correct or incorrect; they are either strong or weak,
17 Cf. my Raison iternelle, raison historique, in JusTncE ET RAsoN 103.
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relevant or irrelevant. The strength or weakness is judged according to the
rule of justice, which requires that essentially similar situations be treated in the
same manner. Relevance and irrelevance are to be examined according
to the rules and criteria recognized by the various disciplines and their
methodologies.
Unfortunately, there exists no methodology common to philosophy which
would allow one to decide the value of a philosophical argument. Philosophers usually borrow their postulates and their techniques of reasoning
either from the history of philosophy by situating themselves in a system, or
else from one of the several disciplines from which they draw inspiration.
Until he has constructed his own philosophy, a philosopher will possess no
satisfying criteria for judging a philosophical argument in coherent fashion.
His own philosophy is never complete, but as it moves toward completion it
furnishes him with increasingly reliable criteria for judging the strength and
relevance of his own arguments, as well as the arguments of those who oppose
him. Because of the value he places on the coherence of his thought, he will
find it more difficult to refute ad hominem arguments, those based on internal
criticism founded on theses whose value he himself explicitly recognizes.' 8
However great the talents and the efforts of the philosopher, he will
rarely succeed in convincing all his interlocutors. Often he will try to make
up for it by disqualifying the man who doesn't agree with him. Are there
men who do not believe in God? "That is a great question," says La Bruy~re;
and he continues: "If there existed anyone like that, that would only prove
the world is not devoid of monsters." 19 La Bruy re here is using a technique
of St. Anselm's, who treats the unbeliever as insane. 20 This procedure of
disqualification, which allows one simply to dismiss his adversaries, occurs
more frequently than one might think. It is, however, not always possible,
for sometimes the adversaries make up a considerable part of the universal
audience. In that case, one might try to prove that the knowledge of true
reality and true values is accessible only to an elite, only to those who have
a grace and dispose of special means of understanding not available to
everyone. But to make such a claim consistent with philosophical thinking,
the arguments on which it is based must be addressed to the universal audience,
including those who will be subsequently disqualified by them.
Philosophical reasoning being what it is, we must resign ourselves to
the fact that philosophical controversies are part of the very nature of phi18 Cf. H.
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losophy. In effect, argumentation- even rational argumentation- is not
by nature coercive. There exist no nonformal criteria transcending all philosophy to which rational argumentation must conform. That is why, ultimately, philosophical reasoning implies the philosopher's freedom of judgment as well as his responsibility. The philosopher who judges commits himself; in judging a philosophy, we are also judging the man who is identified
with it.
If this is true, the criteria, the values, and the norms of a philosophy do
not constitute absolute and impersonal values and truths. They express the
convictions and aspirations of a free but reasonable man, engaged in a
creative, personal, and historically situated effort: that of proposing to the
universal audience as he sees it, a number of acceptable theses. He will try to
justify those theses, or else show that they do not require justification, taking
into account any objections or criticisms which seem to him pertinent. Aware'
of his limitations, the philosopher knows that his efforts will not produce
a definitive and complete work. Even if he has succeeded in surmounting
difficulties and- problems of which he is conscious, he foresees that the future
reserves other difficulties and problems for mankind; and he is aware that
the advancement of knowledge will modify and shake the convictions which
today appear to him acceptable to the ur-ersal public. It will be for others,
who will come after him, to continue his efforts for more rationality and
justice, and less violence, in the relations of men.

